The Ideological and Pragmatical in Polish-Ukrainian Relations.

Abstract

This article analyzes the role of ideological and pragmatical philosophical attitudes as factors in the contempromary history of Polish-Ukrainian relations. The clash of Ukrainian pragmatism with Polish adherence to ideology is suggested as the result of such factors. The analysis of literature, both Ukrainian and foreign, suggest that the clash of the Poles and the Ukrainians in the sphere of ideology is understood by a number of researchers, but the reasoning for such a clash is seen as the introduction of pure populism into political discourse. Ukrainian researchers specifically are noted to view the issue as “unneeded reliance on history”, generally seeing it as something negative, something that removes the focus from the things that really matter in the international relations (usually concentrating on their economical element). Polish researchers, as well as politicians, however, consider such issues quite important, and relevant to the ascent of both the Poles and the Ukrainians into “European society”, as well as the adoption of European values. The article overviews the development of Polish-Ukrainian relations after the Republic of Poland’s ascension into the ranks of the European Union; specifically looking at some of the particularly issue-ridden, problematic moments with regard to this clash of ideologies. The analysis suggests the prevalence of pragmatism in Ukrainian thinking regarding the Polish-Ukrainian relations, as they consider the relations to be “successful” and thus “true and free of negative points” in case they bring profit for both sides (similarly to the way of establishing something as “true” in Pragmatist philosophy). The Poles, on the other hand, cannot in good faith consider the relations stellar if the issues relevant to their national memory are ignored. This dualism of Ukrainian pragmatism and Polish ideologism is represented by the approach of their governments to the resolution of conflicts based on shared historical memory. Although both governments approached each other with the intent of unbiased partnership, the Polish side had to cave in to their electors’ demands to keep positive reputation inside the country; while the Ukrainian side continuously offered to ignore their own historical grievances to stay in Polish favor, knowing that the electorate wouldn’t mind much. The disparity of the views can be seen by analyzing the documented statements of Polish historians, politicians, bureaucratic functionaries, with their Ukrainian counterparts. It can also be shown in bilateral treaties themselves, as well as the countries’ officials’ positions stated on multilateral meetings, such as those regarding European defense. The issue of possible lost respect for Ukraine’s position from the Polish side is suggested and overviewed, with additional recommendations on how to evade further misunderstandings. However, the article also analyzes the possibility of Ukrainian electorate’s (or at least its active, educated part’s) rising interest to radicalize the issue in the similar way to its Polish counterpart; as a number of historians, political science researchers, religious authorities start chagrin on the Polish side’s lack of desire to owe up to the grievances Ukrainians had against them, concentrating only on “Ukrainians’ crimes”. The recommendations regarding such possibilities are also provided. The reasoning for the rise of Ukrainian pragmatic and Polish ideological approaches to foreign policy is suggested as an independent topic of a future study, as the author refuses to simply use some basic claims regarding “national mentalities”, so as not to err on the side of ethnic stereotypes.